Entreprises en difficulté et règlement amiable. Faut-il supprimer la possibilité de suspension provisoire des poursuites ?

Regis Deloche () and Bertrand Chopard

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 3, 489-498

Abstract: Existing French bankruptcy/insolvency law is composed of extra-judicial treatment of firms? difficulties and judicial treatment of their failures. In the first part, there is mediation. French mediation procedure falls mainly within the province of bargaining theory. However, during the negotiation between the manager of the failing firm and its chief creditors, the president of the commercial court may suspend all lawsuits by creditors. Through a case-study, we highlight the drawbacks of this situation. To this end, we use a signaling game because the information context is asymmetric, and the manager of the failing firm has the exclusive right to declare financial distress and demand that creditors agree to a workout. Classification JEL : C7, K2

JEL-codes: C7 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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