L'effort de recherche d'emploi et le comportement cyclique du chômage et des emplois vacants

Fabien Tripier

Revue économique, 2005, vol. 56, issue 3, 573-582

Abstract: The ability of the standard matching model to explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies is much debated. Shimer [2004ab] and Hall [2004] criticism this model for its lack of amplification mechanisms. They agree that this failure comes from the determination of wages according to a Nash bargaining process. We propose an alternative explanation based on the search intensity, which is constant in these contributions. The variability of search intensity constitutes a relevant amplification mechanism to account for the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies even if the equilibrium wage is the outcome of Nash bargaining.

Date: 2005
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