Tarifications d'un bien soumis à la congestion

Khaïreddine Jebsi and Lionel Thomas

Revue économique, 2005, vol. 56, issue 3, 659-667

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal pricings of a congestible good when users are privately informed both on the valuation of the good and on their unit waiting costs. Hence, conflicts appear between incentives and individual rationality. We show that the textbook price is higher than that of the same good when users? unit waiting cost is perfectly correlated with their valuation for that good and lower in case the users have private unit waiting cost.

Date: 2005
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