Les externalités sociales permettent-elles de résoudre la controverse théorique des « petites coalitions stables » dans les accords environnementaux ?

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin and Shyama Ramani ()

Revue économique, 2006, vol. 57, issue 3, 431-438

Abstract: A puzzle in the literature on the formation of coalitions supporting International Environmental Agreements (iea) is that if an iea leads to substantial gains, then it will not be supported by many countries. The non-cooperative game theoretic literature highlights the « small coalitions » puzzle by which only a small number of countries are willing to sign an environmental convention. In these models, a global coalition comprising all countries or most of the countries and generating significant global benefits is not sustainable. In effect, greater the number of countries in the coalition, higher the incentive of signatories to not respect their engagements. Introducing social externalities, we explain why in reality, some treaties can be sustained by nearly all the countries in the world, and others can be sustained by a handful of countries. Classification JEL : C72, H41, D74, Q00.

JEL-codes: C72 D74 H41 Q00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_573_0431 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2006-3-page-431.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Les externalités sociales permettent-elles de résoudre la controverse théorique des « petites coalitions stables » dans les accords environnementaux ? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0431

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().