Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling

Pierre Fleckinger () and Thierry Lafay ()

Revue économique, 2006, vol. 57, issue 3, 573-581

Abstract: We study a duopoly on a market with horizontal differentiation where firms compete in catalog : firms choose a price and a location in the consumer? space. Whereas there is no equilibrium in pure strategy for the simultaneous game, we show that an equilibrium always exists in a sequential competition. In this subgame perfect equilibrium the leader chooses a more specific product at a lower price than the follower. Thus the leader earns finally less than the follower. This introduces a tension between the temptation of attrition, which leads to an unstable configuration, and the will to guarantee a stricly positive profit. Classification JEL : L11, H41, D43, M3.

JEL-codes: D43 H41 L11 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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