Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public

David de la Croix and Clara Delavallade

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 3, 637-647

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favour of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where a planner chooses the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint reflecting households? choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations with instrumental variables. Countries with a failing legal system have higher levels of corruption, spend relatively more in physical capital than in education and health, and they grow slower, in particular if the political power is highly concentrated. Classification JEL : O41, H50, D73.

JEL-codes: D73 H50 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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