Apprentissage des préférences des banques centrales. Quel est le degré optimal de transparence ?

Marie Musard-Gies ()

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 3, 671-682

Abstract: In a context of private sector uncertainty about the central bank preferences, we investigate whether it is desirable that the central bank facilitates the learning of the private sector on its preferences by revealing the macroeconomic transmission disturbances. In the absence of an in?ation bias, the central bank?s objective is the stabilization of output in the face of supply shocks. In addition to this objective of ?exibility of monetary policy, we suppose that public expectations errors reduce the social welfare. When the private sector overestimate the in?ation stabilization parameter, we show that opacity is preferred by the central bank whereas an intermediate degree of transparency is likely to improve social welfare. Classi?cation JEL : E58

JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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