Assurance chômage optimale, capital humain et vote

Sébastien Ménard

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 3, 703-712

Abstract: This paper examines the characteristics of the unemployment insurance when the human capital decreases throughout the unemployment spell. We consider three instruments of economic policy : the replacement ratio, the duration of ui benefits and the level of minimum benefits. We show that the optimal ui is characterized by (i) a high replacement ratio, (ii) a short duration of ui benefits and (iii) low duration benefits. However, the politico-economic equilibrium leads to increase the duration of benefits. Classification JEL : D72, J24, J65

JEL-codes: D72 J24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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