L'efficacité dynamique du brevet versus son inefficience statique. Un compromis utilisant l'exigence de nouveauté

Gilles Koléda ()

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 4, 789-806

Abstract: There is a well-known tradeoff between dynamic efficacy and static inefficiency created by the patent system existence. In this article, we stress on the possibility to realize an arbitrage between these two effects by setting the novelty requirement, or height of the patent. We integrate into the Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality ladders growth model framework both the heterogeneity of the increment of quality and the obligation for innovators that the qualitative increment of their invention overpasses a statutory threshold set by the Patent Office: the Patent?s Novelty Requirement. We examine the advantage and the opportunities open by this regulation of innovation and growth by setting the patent?s novelty requirement. Classification JEL : O34, 040.

JEL-codes: O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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