Une décision de crédit-bail peut aussi être un bon signal

Frédéric Lobez and Jean-Christophe Statnik

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 4, 941-951

Abstract: Within a framework of information asymmetry, we study the informative content of a lease financing decision. The riskiest firms being most disposed to increase their economic risk, we show the rationality of a signalling equilibrium in which the firms of better quality voluntarily restrict their possibilities of substituting assets by privileging financing by leasing in relation to that by bank debt. We conclude that firms of good quality can signal themselves while using more leasing.

Date: 2007
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