Que peut-on attendre de l'interdiction de licencier pour améliorer la compétitivité des entreprises ?

Pierre Cahuc and Stéphane Carcillo ()

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 6, 1221-1245

Abstract: In France, since the mid 1990, employment protection legislation allows employers to layoff workers in order to ?safeguard? their profits but not to improve them. Our paper shows that this aspect of the French employment protection legislation is an exception among European countries. Then, we provide a theoretical model in which employers can layoff workers to increase their profits and because their jobs yield negative profits. In this context, it is shown that it is socially efficient to impose the same layoff cost for both types of layoff. This result casts doubts on the relevance of the specificity of the employment protection legislation adopted in France since the mid 1990.

Date: 2007
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