Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence. Le gas release

Corinne Chaton, Farid Gasmi, Marie-Laure Guillerminet and Juan Oviedo ()

Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 3, 475-486

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the « artificial » duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. Classification JEL : L51, L95

JEL-codes: L51 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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