Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence. Le gas release
Marie-Laure Guillerminet and
Juan Oviedo ()
Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 3, 475-486
This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the ??artificial?? duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. Classification JEL?: L51, L95
JEL-codes: L51 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_593_0475
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