Une analyse théorique et empirique des déterminants sous-jacents dans la prise de décision

Aurélie Bonein ()

Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 3, 675-684

Abstract: We propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents? payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don?t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals? decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL : C25, C72, C91, D63

JEL-codes: C25 C72 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_593_0675 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2008-3-page-675.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_593_0675

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().