Accord climatique. Concessions et ratifications
Pierre Courtois and
Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 4, 719-735
We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as such while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concessions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to accept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concession. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession. Classification JEL?: C78, D72, D74, Q53.
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D74 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_594_0719
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