Assurance santé et sélection adverse. L'incidence des maladies invalidantes

David Alary () and Franck Bien

Revue économique, 2008, vol. 59, issue 4, 737-748

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions such that first best contracts can be optimal with asymmetric information. Classification JEL : D82, I1.

JEL-codes: D82 I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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