Rémunérations des p-dg français. Les actionnaires peuvent-ils souhaiter un plafonnement ?

Fabienne Llense

Revue économique, 2009, vol. 60, issue 3, 759-766

Abstract: In the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extent such a model could explain the observed ceo compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate these compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European Left but also, more surprisingly, by representatives of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this job assignement model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained. Classification JEL : J31, J33, D33, D41.

JEL-codes: D33 D41 J31 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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