Contrôle des concentrations et lutte anticartels. Substituts ou compléments ?

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Revue économique, 2010, vol. 61, issue 3, 623-633

Abstract: This paper examines the interaction between two branches of the competition policy, the merger control and the anticartel fighting. Our model takes into account both the imperfect information of the competition agency on the quality of coordination projects undertaken by the industry firms, and the private choice of firms between cartels and mergers. We show that the two above-mentioned branches of the competition policy may be either substitutable or complementary, depending on the cost of resources available to the competition agency. Classification JEL : L41, K21, D82

JEL-codes: D82 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Contrôle des concentrations et lutte anticartels: substituts ou compléments ? (2010)
Working Paper: Contrôle des concentrations et lutte anticartels: substituts ou compléments ? (2010)
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