Étudier le non-recours à l'assurance chômage

Sylvie Blasco and Francois Fontaine

Revue économique, 2010, vol. 61, issue 5, 933-943

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the empirical evidence of unemployment insurance non take-up. Our framework is focused on four determinants of take-up: the monetary incentives, the imperfect information about the eligibility rules, the administrative difficulties to make a claim and the non-monetary incentives such as the effectiveness of the unemployment agency as a search method. Our model accounts for the dynamics of take-up and the endogenous link between job search and benefit claiming. We show that the existence of non take-up may affect the evaluation of unemployment insurance systems. Classification JEL : J64, J65, C41

JEL-codes: C41 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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