When are Central Bankers Removed?

Muhammad Hayat () and Etienne Farvaque

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 471-478

Abstract: This paper shows that the probability of replacing a central bank governor is positively related to the time already spent in office, to banking and currency crises, the occurrence of elections, central bank independence reforms, and inflation. Moreover, results are shown to depend on the change being a regular or irregular one, and whether it occurs before or after the legal term.

Date: 2011
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