Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up

Chantal Marlats ()

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 557-565

Abstract: We consider two economic partners involved in a long-run relationship where one of them, the seller, must choose to make a specicific investment or not. Once realized, the other partner, the buyer, can expropriate a part of the surplus. This leads the buyer to not make the investment. A recent literature shows that in dynamic situations there exists an efficient equilibrium (Che et Sakoviks [2004]). We explore reputation effects by introducing asymmetric information about one of the players? type. We show that only the seller can establish a reputation. In this case he invests in a suboptimal way in all equilibria. This information asymmetry can be made arbitrarily small. This suggests that dynamic considerations may not be a robust approach for efficiency in hold up situations, at least in this setting. Classification JEL : L14, C73.

JEL-codes: C73 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_623_0557 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2011-3-page-557.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_623_0557

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().