Pouvoir de négociation et procédure d'engagements en droit de la concurrence

Saïd Souam () and Arnold Vialfont

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 609-619

Abstract: We analyze the impact of the introduction of a commitments procedure in terms of efficiency and deterrence in antitrust contexts. This procedure consists in offering an immunity of fine to a firm in return for commitments that meet the competition concerns expressed to her. We first show that this procedure lowers the deterrent effect of the authorities? intervention but may enhance the consumers? surplus through an insurance effect against type-II errors. We also show that the bargaining power has a decisive effect since the firm may recover all of the procedural efficiency. We conclude that time inconsistency of the authority generally reduces the consumers? surplus. Classification JEL : K21, K42, L41.

JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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