Alliances électorales entre deux tours de scrutin. Le point de vue de la théorie des jeux coopératifs et une application aux élections régionales de mars 2010

Michel Le Breton and Karine Van der Straeten ()

Revue économique, 2013, vol. 64, issue 2, 173-240

Abstract: In the article, we use two major solutions in cooperative game theory ?the Shapley value and the nucleolus? to study electoral bargaining in the electoral environment characterizing the French Regional elections of March 2010. Classification JEL : D71, D72

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Alliances Electorales entre Deux Tours de Scrutin: Le Point de Vue de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs et une Application aux Elections Régionales de Mars 2010 (2012)
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