Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise

Pierre Fleckinger (), Thierry Lafay () and Constance Monnier

Revue économique, 2013, vol. 64, issue 3, 457-467

Abstract: We study the stockholder-manager relationship in a firm when an illicit strategy can be followed. We derive the optimal compensation offered by the firm and examine how it affects the ceo?s action. We then discuss the optimality of stock-options or free-stocks. Moreover, we analyze the link between the public policy and the ceo?s compensation ; we prove that the fine level cannot be a substitute for a low level of detection. Finally, we point out that each protagonist has divergent preferences over the public policy regarding corporate fraud. Classification JEL : J33, K21, K42, M12, M52

JEL-codes: J33 K21 K42 M12 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (2013)
Working Paper: Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (2013)
Working Paper: Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (2013)
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