Droit des actionnaires et concentration de la propriété en Europe

Tristan Auvray ()

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 1, 159-199

Abstract: This paper presents legal indicators dealing with shareholder rights in general meeting. Assembled with the help of a comparative legal study (Shearman &Sterling LLP [2007]), the indicator is calculated for fifteen European countries. These measures reflect the ability of shareholders to appoint and dismiss directors of listed companies (?control rights?) and the requirement of their vote on multiple decisions in general meeting (?structure rights?). A study on a sample of 287 European companies shows that these new indicators predict corporate control outcomes: the higher the control and structure rights are the more corporations are controlled by shareholders rather than by directors. This study highlights the institutional complementarities between the indicators we build, the Law and Finance indicators of legal protection of minority shareholders and ownership concentration. Classification JEL : G2, G34, K22

JEL-codes: G2 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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