Une approche stratégique du vote. À propos de « Vote par approbation, vote par note »

François Allisson and Nicolas Brisset ()

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 3, 681-686

Abstract: This text has the ambition to return to an experimental procedure designed to test the impact of approval voting as well as evaluating voting on the scope of what is called in French vote utile (strategic voting). The results of these experiences, held during the 2007 and 2012 French presidential elections, have been exposed in two papers published in the Revue économique. Our aim is to catch the attention of readers on the implicit conception inherent to these experiences : voting as a means to reveal individual preferences. Such a direction is taken at the cost of a strategic conception of voting, i.e. voting as a coordination process. The design of the experimental procedure tends to erase this dimension, by depriving the voters of information on other voters? choices. This is what we call informational isolation. Classification JEL : D72 ; B41 ; D80 ; C93

JEL-codes: C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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