Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ?

David Martimort and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 4, 481-497

Abstract: This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution. Classification JEL : Q54 ; D82 ; D62.

JEL-codes: D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? (2014)
Working Paper: Accords environnementaux. Le marché peut-il réussir l'arbitrage entre incitations et participation ? (2014)
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