Négociation stratégique et utilité non espérée. L'approche par la prime de risque de désaccord

Jean-Max Koskievic

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 5, 653-674

Abstract: The main object of the paper is to use the Non-Expected Utility Theory extension of the concept of boldness or fear of disagreement, in order to highlight the central role played by the risk posture of the bargainer in a sequential bargaining game. This yields to the notion of bargainer?s disagreement risk premium as measuring the minimum premium (in excess of his present share of the pie) that the bargainer would have to be guaranteed in the next period of bargaining in order to be willing to reject the present offer of partition and bear the risk of getting zero with positive probability if disagreement takes place. Classification JEL : C70 ; C72 ; C78

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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