Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes

Nadia Saghi-Zedek and Amine Tarazi

Revue économique, 2015, vol. 66, issue 3, 527-535

Abstract: This article empirically investigates the impact of shareholders? excess control rights (greater control than cash-flow rights) on the default risk of European commercial banks.?While the presence of excess control rights is associated with higher default risk during normal times, conversely, it contributed to enhance banks? resilience during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.?Further evidence shows that, regardless of the state of the economy, the effect of excess control rights on default risk is accentuated in family-controlled banks and in countries with weak shareholder protection rights. Classification JEL : G21, G28

JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes (2015)
Working Paper: Droits de contrôle versus droits pécuniaires, crise financière et vulnérabilité des banques européennes (2015)
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