Common Value Auctions with Voluntary and Qualified Entry

Marco Casari and Timothy Cason

Revue économique, 2016, vol. 67, issue 5, 953-976

Abstract: We study auctions under different entry rules. In the field, individuals self-select into auctions and regulations often require them to meet specific qualifications. In this experiment we assess the role of voluntary entry and financial requirements on the incidence of severe overbidding and bankruptcies, which are widespread in common value auctions. We show that voluntary entry amplifies overbidding and increases bankruptcy rates. Qualified entry has only modest impacts on overbidding. This study adds new insights to existing experiments where all subjects are usually placed exogenously into auctions.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_675_0953 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2016-5-page-953.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_675_0953

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().