Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée

Thierry Magnac

Revue économique, 2018, vol. 69, issue 5, 683-708

Abstract: We review recent articles that focus on developing structural empirical methods to estimate the preferences of agents, students and universities, or students and schools, who participate in centralized allocation mechanisms.?This empirical research endeavors, first of all, to confirm or invalidate the hypotheses and predictions of the theoretical models developed in the last twenty years.?It also allows for concrete analyzes of existing mechanisms, by estimating the counterfactual impact of changes in the mechanisms used and by comparing between various mechanisms.?Finally, they lead to arguments and conditions of application that justify the use of such or such mechanisms. Classification JEL : C18, C57, D47, D82, I21.

Keywords: education; matching; mechanism design; applied econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C18 C57 D47 D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d'allocation centralisée (2018)
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