Comment le contrôle des chômeurs modifie-t-il le contrat optimal d’assurance chômage ?

Sébastien Ménard and Solenne Tanguy

Revue économique, 2018, vol. 69, issue 5, 745-778

Abstract: Unemployment insurance is commonly believed to adversely affect job search behavior and to lengthen the duration of unemployment.?Given that job search is difficult to monitor, much literature has focused on the need for decreasing unemployment benefits according to the unemployment duration as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997].?In a principal-agent model, we argue that monitoring individual behavior associated with credible penalities in case of insufficient effort can undermine the need for a declining sequence.?In particular, if the monitoring technology is almost perfect, proposing an increasing sequence of unemployment benefits with the unemployment duration is optimal in that it increases the opportunity cost of shirking. Classification JEL : D82, H53, J65, J68.

Keywords: unemployment insurance; incentives; monitoring; sanctions; public expenditures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H53 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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