Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies

David Martimort

Revue économique, 2018, vol. 69, issue 6, 1025-1053

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to question the optimistic view of the political game that is offered by the theory of common agency. According to this literature, competition between lobbying groups leads to efficiency; a result that echoes the view that pluralistic politics has brought in political science following Dahl [1963]?s seminal work. If one modifies the common agency paradigm by introducing infirmational problems both within interest groups but also in their relationships with political decision-maker, organizational inefficiencies within groups percolate to the whole political process that ends up being inefficient. This paper describes the kind of transaction costs that then affect the political process. Classification JEL: D72, D82.

Keywords: common agency; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies (2018)
Working Paper: Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies (2018)
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