Menacer, sanctionner ou conseiller ? Prosociaux vs individualistes: quels leviers incitatifs pour quels individus ?

Agnès Festré, Ankinée Kirakozian and Mira Toumi

Revue économique, 2019, vol. 70, issue 6, 1125-1138

Abstract: In this article we investigate and compare the effect of a collective sanction (namely, an increase of the tax burden) with a recommendation, both from a third-party, in a public good game ?à la Andreoni [1993]? where crowding-out is possible. Furthermore, we test for the correlation between the incentives and the social orientation of subjects on cooperation by using a social value orientation (SVO) test. Our results show that, in general, the sanction is more powerful than the recommendation but also that the threat of punishment has a disciplinary impact by enhancing cooperation. Moreover, we show that both sanction and its threat have a different impact according to the social orientation of subjects: contrary to individualists and competitors, prosocials are not significantly sensitive to both. Classification JEL : Q53, C91, D03.

Keywords: public good; voluntary contribution; incentives; social preferences; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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