Lutte contre les cartels: comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Constance Monnier-Schlumberger

Revue économique, 2019, vol. 70, issue 6, 1187-1199

Abstract: This article proposes an experimental approach that makes it possible to identify the individuals who are most likely to form a cartel: the ?hotheads.? The experiments test the deterrent effectiveness of antitrust schemes by comparing the propensity to agree to cartel in different sanctions frameworks?fine, leniency, compliance and exclusion?and detection?detection with exogenous probability or by denunciation. Compliance and exclusion are particularly dissuasive, leniency is not. The deterrent effect of high fines is limited for ?hotheads,? who are more influenced by the magnitude of the detection risk. Gender differences and risk aversion impact behaviors of the other participants but not of the participants described as ?hotheads.? Classification JEL : K21, K42, L41.

Keywords: antitrust policy; cartels; leniency; fines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lutte contre les cartels: Comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ? (2019)
Working Paper: Lutte contre les cartels: comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ? (2019)
Working Paper: Lutte contre les cartels: comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ? (2019)
Working Paper: Lutte contre les cartels: Comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ? (2019)
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