Effets stratégiques de la qualité des éléments de preuve dans une procédure accusatoire

Claude Fluet and Thomas Lanzi

Revue économique, 2020, vol. 71, issue 3, 403-428

Abstract: In an adversarial procedure, the parties have to invest in acquiring evidence in order to prove the facts relating to their claims. As investment in acquiring evidence is costly, each party invests in this activity only according to the benefits it expects. We analyze the effect of improving the quality of potential evidence on the risk of judicial error. This risk decreases if the demand for evidence of the parties is not too elastic and if the manipulation of evidences is limited. However, when such a manipulation is possible, we show that the judge?s rational skepticism, combined with the effects on investment in acquiring evidence, can then lead to more judicial error.

Keywords: adversarial procedure; evidence; information quality; strategic manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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