Règle anglaise versus règle américaine d’allocation des frais de justice: une analyse expérimentale
Emmanuel Peterle () and
Revue économique, 2020, vol. 71, issue 6, 973-1004
In this paper, we conduct an experiment in order to analyze how the trial costs allocation rule (i.e., American or English rule) may shape the efficiency of the litigation process, via its effect on the attorney?s effort, the deterrence of meritless claims and the plaintiff?s incentives to go to court. It appears that the English rule helps to screen out low-quality claims, partly by lessening attorneys? incentives to provide effort to defend such cases ex post (and hence discouraging potential clients to go to trial ex ante).
Keywords: litigation; fee-shifting rules; moral hazard; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_716_0973
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