SIGEM: analyse de la procédure d’affectation dans les grandes écoles de management

Vincent Iehlé and Julien Jacqmin

Revue économique, 2023, vol. 74, issue 2, 139-168

Abstract: The SIGEM centralized procedure is in charge of assigning potential candidates to business schools in France. The analysis reveals the use of a well-know algorithm, namely the college-proposing version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm. The theoretical results of the two-sided matching literature, related to this algorithm, make possible the identification of fundamental properties satisfied by the procedure. Some specificities of the SIGEM environment may also generate strategic behaviors on the side of participants, be they candidates or schools. Eventually, we show how the outcome of the mechanism is used to generate a strict ranking of schools. The implications of this common ranking of schools, specific to SIGEM, are also assessed.

Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithms; two-sided matching; enrollment system; common ranking; French business schools (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: SIGEM: Analyse de la Procédure d’Affectation dans les Grandes Ecoles de Management (2023)
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