Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Françoise Forges

Revue économique, 2023, vol. 74, issue 4, 529-539

Abstract: Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.

Keywords: bayes rationality; information structure; strategic equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_744_0529 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2023-4-page-529.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_744_0529

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (operations@cairn.info).