Common Knowledge in Game Theory

Lucie Ménager

Revue économique, 2023, vol. 74, issue 4, 569-599

Abstract: When something is known to all and everybody knows that it is known to all, everybody knows that everybody knows that it is known to all and so on ad infinitum, this thing is said to be common knowledge. Aumann [1976] was the first to provide a formal characterization of the notion of common knowledge in his celebrated article ?Agreeing to Disagree.? This formalism has raised a number of exciting questions. Can commonly known individual differences in actions or beliefs be explained by asymmetric information? Do players need some sort of common knowledge to coordinate on some action profile? Can a group of individuals achieve common knowledge by communicating with each other? The purpose of this article is to review the work that has attempted to answer these questions. JEL Codes: C70, C72, D80, D82.

Keywords: common knowledge; agreeing to disagree; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_744_0569 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2023-4-page-569.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_744_0569

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().