Models of Wages and Mobility in Frictional Labor Markets with Random Search

Rasmus Lentz

Revue économique, 2024, vol. 75, issue 1, 113-145

Abstract: I survey frictional labor market models of equilibrium wage determination and mobility. Search is random. Competition between firms is in terms of value promises to workers. The exact nature of the competition dictates the distribution of value promises in the economy. Worker mobility and allocation to jobs are often understood directly from this part of the model. The survey details how employment contract design restrictions map contract values into wages. JEL Codes: D4, D6, E24, J31, J41, J63, J64.

Keywords: wage determination; employment and job mobility; labor market friction; employment contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D6 E24 J31 J41 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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