Militarisme et durée au pouvoir: une analyse économique à l’ère de la démocratie en Afrique

Hibrahim Limi Kouotou

Revue économique, 2024, vol. 75, issue 2, 371-405

Abstract: The aim of this study is to assess the effect of militarism on the length of time heads of state have been in power since the advent of democracy in Africa. Using a panel of 44 countries between 1990 and 2015, we show that militarism affects the length of time in power thanks to two levers: militarisation on the one hand and control of the administration by military leaders on the other. Militarisation increases the length of time heads of state stay in power, by forcing the allegiance of an army that is satisfied with its growing budget, manpower and equipment. However, administrative control of the military has a mixed effect. While having a military officer as head of state increases the length of time the head of state remains in power, having a Defence minister who belongs to the armed forces has the opposite effect. We conclude that the post-Cold War democratic era certainly provides an external explanation for the decline, albeit slight, in the length of time in power in Africa; but militarism, through its mixed effects, provides an internal explanation.

Keywords: militarism; militarisation; democracy; duration in power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_752_0371 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2024-2-page-371.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_752_0371

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().