Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

Sébastien Broos (), Axel Gautier (), Jorge Marcos Ramos and Nicolas Petit

Revue économique, 2016, vol. 67, issue HS1, 79-94

Abstract: Our paper brings together an original dataset comprising all cartels fined by the European Commission since May 2004. We present a set of statistical results relating to cartel design and cartel enforcement both at the Commission and General Court?s level. The research highlights the importance of leniency applications and recidivist considerations. We show that more than half of the undertakings are leniency applicants. These benefit from a 37% fine reduction on average. Further, recidivism is quite frequent as it concerns 27% of cases. Nevertheless, the fine increase is not systematic. Our research puts in perspective the importance of ?appeals? before the General Court where 63% of the fines are upheld. Lastly, our research focuses on the factors influencing the outcome of an appeal, notably the importance of the case. Classification JEL : K21, K40, L41.

JEL-codes: K21 K40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_HS01_0079 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2016-HS1-page-79.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014) (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_hs01_0079

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().