Cartels et comportements des managers: analyse et implications pour les politiques publiques

Emmanuel Combe and Constance Monnier-Schlumberger

Revue économique, 2016, vol. 67, issue HS1, 95-109

Abstract: In this article, we study the incentives of a manager implicated in a cartel. We apply a cost-benefit analysis, relating to the decision of starting and/or remaining in a cartel, at an individual level, including psychological and behavioral factors. Then we study how to dissuade him/her from colluding. Beyond administrative fines and detection by competition authorities, we analyse solutions inside the firm which contribute to better deter managers from engaging into these illegal practices, and the role of public policy, in the broad sense of the term, in preventing these behaviors. Classification JEL : K21, K42, L41, M12, M14.

JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 M12 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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