Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée
Eric Avenel and
Stephane Caprice
Revue économique, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, 5-28
Abstract:
We analyze the sustainability of an agreement in the presence of a threat of entry in a context where incumbent firms are vertically integrated. Entrants depend on integrated firms for their supplies. While the entry leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that entry lowers profits in punishment periods. In this sense, the possibility of entry facilitates collusion between integrated firms.
Keywords: collusion; vertical integration; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2018)
Working Paper: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0110
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