EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée

Éric Avenel and Stephane Caprice

Revue économique, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, 5-28

Abstract: We analyze the sustainability of an agreement in the presence of a threat of entry in a context where incumbent firms are vertically integrated.?Entrants depend on integrated firms for their supplies.?While the entry leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that entry lowers profits in punishment periods.?In this sense, the possibility of entry facilitates collusion between integrated firms.

Keywords: collusion; vertical integration; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_PR2_0110 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2018-1-page-5.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0110

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().

 
Page updated 2020-11-24
Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0110