EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

L'invention du régulateur bancaire dans les années 1930 aux États-Unis

Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe

Revue d'économie financière, 2012, vol. N° 105, issue 1, 71-102

Abstract: Some bank reforms of the thirties may have been overvalued. The Glass-Steagall Act created new endogenous risks implying possible systemic effects. Deposit insurance failed to address the main cause of banking panics, the prohibition of bank branching preventing diversification of idiosyncratic risks while reinforcing inefficient unit banks. Separation of commercial and investment banking avoided certain conflicts of interest at an opportunity cost associated with rejecting universal banking. Moreover, the regulator was captured by the regulated as it expressed a preference toward an aggressive participant in a duopolistic conflict. On the opposite, major innovations in bailout process and prudential regulation appeared underestimated. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation of 1932 established the investor of last resort giving the Treasury the authority to recapitalize an insolvent financial institution deemed too big to fail. The banking regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of 1933, was given a special bank-closure rule, different from the usual bankruptcy proceedings, which allowed for orderly resolution of failing banks with a view to protect the economy from systemic risk. Classification JEL: G28, N12, N4.

JEL-codes: G28 N12 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=ECOFI_105_0071 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-financiere-2012-1-page-71.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_105_0071

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie financière from Association d'économie financière
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_105_0071