Les barrières à l'entrée expliquent-elles le comportement des banques dans la CEMAC ?

Désiré Avom and Rodrigue Nana Kuindja

Revue d'économie financière, 2017, vol. N° 127, issue 3, 309-334

Abstract: This article identifies the barriers to entry of the CEMAC banking market and analyzes the behavior of banks in a competitive situation. The allotment efficiency scores, for the period 2000 to 2014, reveal the CEMAC banks' dissuasive strategies. The highest scores indicate more restrictive regulations and therefore higher barriers. The degree of restriction of banking regulation is related to net interest margins. Thus, a 85% increase in the level of restrictions to entry results in an increase of 8,71% of the interest rate loans, with considerable differences between countries. We suggest the implementation of a dynamic approach to provisioning as well as of business intelligence within banks. Classification JEL: G21, G28, O55.

JEL-codes: G21 G28 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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