La revolving door dans les banques centrales

Emmanuel Carré and Élise Demange

Revue d'économie financière, 2017, vol. N° 128, issue 4, 233-254

Abstract: Regulators frequently work for the firms they were formerly regulating. According to the literature, this so-called phenomenon of ?revolving door? is supposed to generate a risk of conflict of interest, and even a risk of capture of the regulator. The article analyses the potential existence of a revolving door in central banks. We produce an overview of central bankers? careers before and after the central bank. Our database shows that revolving door is significant, especially at the exit of the central bank. Our results allow to provide a portrait of a typical revolving door: entry in a central bank follows a career in the banking sector and exit from a central bank is followed by an appointment to a managerial position in the asset management sector after a median period of one year. We propose to lengthen this delay to two years, to regulate the revolving door. Classification JEL: E58, G01, G18 , J62.

JEL-codes: E58 G01 G18 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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