Conflits d’intérêts et gouvernance des banques systémiques: éléments d’analyse critique

Laurence Scialom

Revue d'économie financière, 2018, vol. N° 130, issue 2, 261-275

Abstract: In this paper, we classify the conflicts of interest concerning the systemic banks into two broad categories: on the one hand, the microeconomic conflicts of interest that undermine the fiduciary responsibility towards bank?s customers: on the other hand the macroeconomic conflicts of interest that harm the interest of the society as a whole and feed the collective social mistrust in banks. The basic assumption of this paper states that the financial scandals relating to systemic banks constitute a genuine epidemic which is not an epiphenomenon but rather the symptom of the shortcomings of their governance and of unaddressed conflicts of interest. The understanding of the driving forces leading to a weakening of ethical standards in banking is essential for financial stability and for restoring confidence in the financial system. Moreover it induces major implications for public policy. So, from our point of view economists should have an interest in this field of research. Classification JEL : G21, G28, G34, G38.

JEL-codes: G21 G28 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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