Analyse comparative de la rémunération des dirigeants des grands groupes bancaires mutualistes et non mutualistes français

Hodonou Dannon and Éric Vernier

Revue d'économie financière, 2019, vol. N° 134, issue 2, 205-227

Abstract: The objective of this study is to analyze comparatively the remunerations of the leaders of the six major French banking groups. The results indicate that the legal status explains the remuneration of the leaders of the French banking group. Limited liability banking groups are more generous than mutual banks in executive compensation. In addition, the remuneration is sensitive to the characteristics of the board of directors and the risk of the banking groups. Classification JEL : G21, G32, M12, P13.

JEL-codes: G21 G32 M12 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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