Les votes des investisseurs institutionnels sur les externalités produites par les entreprises: le cas de deux investisseurs emblématiques

Marie Brière, Sébastien Pouget and Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Revue d'économie financière, 2020, vol. N° 138, issue 2, 119-138

Abstract: Do institutional investors engage with companies on corporate externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions? We study voting at shareholders meetings by two emblematic global investors: BlackRock, a major asset manager, and the Norway Fund, a responsible sovereign wealth fund. Our data cover 2014 and include the two institutions' votes on 35,382 resolutions at 2,796 corporations across the world. Both of these so-called universal owners oppose management significantly more often on externality than on financial issues. The Norway Fund is more active on shareholders resolutions concerning externalities related to environmental and social issues rather than governance issues. The difference between the two investors' voting behaviour is larger when we focus on resolutions related to greenhouse gas emissions, a clearly identified externality. Classification JEL : F21, G11, G23, Q54, Q56.

JEL-codes: F21 G11 G23 Q54 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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